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Since fields I have an interest in are already listed in bio, I'll pin a list of more specific subjects I enjoy exploring: German Idealism, French existentialism/Nietzscheanism, structuralism/post-structuralism, Marxism/post-Marxism, anarchism, speculative realism, American pragmatism, cooperativism, actor-network theory, phenomenology, hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie, Kyoto school, Heideggerianism, legal interpretivism, ethical cognitivist expressivism, emergentism, neutral monism, daoism

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One cannot address epistemological problems (particularly those looking for athiological universality) without at the same time implicitly addressing the mind/body problem. The confusion in Kant suggests he had not really left the Cartesian ego behind.

Kant himself was caught up in this conundrum, as on the one hand he used transcendental idealism as an argument for epistemic universality, and on the other hand he would often speculate about the possibility that other organisms would rely on an entirely different transcendental aesthetic, which would entail relativism for statements of natural philosophy or empirical science. This very confusion might be clarified if one tries to situate this epistemic system in relation to the body.

But what can this subjective transcendental standpoint be? On the one hand it must be something which functions independently of the mind as both real phenomenon and transcendental object. Yet on the other hand, it must be the ground on which the mind as real phenomenon is possible, and for which the mind as transcendental object is always available.

This leads to a standpoint problem, e.g. a problem of the relationship between the empirical and transcendental ego. This is because, those faculties necessary for producing knowledge of the ego must thus exist in such a way that they can be turned back on the ego. For Kant, the solution to the need for a capacity of self-reflection is to posit the act of phenomenal synthesis as in advance already beyond the mere ego being spoken of.

For example, afaik Kant does not directly confront the problem of mind/body dualism. Instead, he develops an epistemology based on an analysis of the relationship between knowledge and the transcendental conditions of that knowledge, which allow for the mind as an empirical object. Paradoxically he starts this analysis with reference to empirical mental acts which he at the same time immediately departs from (as these mental acts take the role of transcendental acts).

Looking back at Kant again and it seems we could very well make the case that the way the subject/object division operates in his transcendental idealism is itself an outcome of constructing his transcendental idealism from the "subjective" standpoint, in his own terms. Or, perhaps better that this division in his philosophy is a transformation of a more basic metaphysical division that itself constitutes and determines the space for the development of a transcendental idealist theory.

Since fields I have an interest in are already listed in bio, I'll pin a list of more specific subjects I enjoy exploring: German Idealism, French existentialism/Nietzscheanism, structuralism/post-structuralism, Marxism/post-Marxism, anarchism, speculative realism, American pragmatism, cooperativism, actor-network theory, phenomenology, hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie, Kyoto school, Heideggerianism, legal interpretivism, ethical cognitivist expressivism, emergentism, neutral monism, daoism

A bit of a mystery what Nishida means to convey by characterizing the phenomena he is describing (which I believe is self-reflection) as an "enveloping," even if it were metaphorical, given his talk of "intinite series" etc.. I will probably gain some insight to this if I sit on it, or gain it from later reading and looking at past notes. If I could read the original Japanese, I wonder if the characterization would make more immediate sense.

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anybody whose been following at scholar.social, new alt account at humanities.one: @mrjunge

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Hello! I am student of the humanities whose interests include (but are not limited to):

Art History
Theology
Aesthetics
Ethics
Ontology
Jurisprudence
Economics

At the moment my focus is primarily around theories of economy and legal practice outside of states (I am a Libertarian Socialist). I also have a keen interest in the intersection between institutional, extrajudicial, and spontaneous violence.

I believe this to be what Nishida is approximately conveying by his analogy--approximately because the process of analogy already presupposes difference. Taking into account other context gone over, the ubiquity of experience, and collapse of subject/object, of course requires Nishida to go beyond this analogy. In some sense, this foreshadows his recourse to speaking of 'Absolute Nothingness.'

If knowing is like physical force as understood by Nishida, then knowing is something which brings determining difference into ideas and thereby constitute them 'consciously' or experientially. More accurately, then, space is already an aspect of things, but considered abstractly can be treated as something independent 'in' which things are. By analogy, consciousness/experience is already an aspect of things, but considered abstractly can be treated as something independent 'in' which things are

What also follows is that truth v. falsehood (epistemic values) arise *after* the subject/object distinction has arisen. This would suggest that an investigation of the metaphysical foundations of logic must begin on some sort of ground that makes the "context" of subject v. object intelligible. My best interpretation of Nishida so far.

The "object" of judgment does involve constitution by a subject, but this does not mean that it is the subject which accounts for the formal properties of propositions or objects. Rather, the subject is already equipped with formalization by virtue of some "material" (in the sense used in logic) relation with objects. The conclusion is that the form v. matter distinction of classical logic or metaphysics of logic functions independently of the subject v. object distinction.

For Nishida, the object of judgment involves a context in which truth and falsehood have already arisen, and this context is distinct from the properties of propositions or statements, which are already situated within a subject-object relation.

What I *can* work out from this analogy, esp. in context, is that Nishida's critique of Kant essentially boils down to what Nishida regards as a false "parallelism" assumption, wherein subject v. object distinction is tracked by a form v. matter distinction, given the conditions of possibility for an object of judgment and the aspects of propositions.

This is a good example of how Nishida tends to write clearly by being merely "suggestive" of his reasoning. He says things as if they were quite obvious, and I have to work out the reasoning myself. To be fair these are excerpts from an anthology, but I still find this to be a good example of deceptive clarity. This is not to say he's wrong--just that there's likely more going on.

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